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There are many instances, in all areas of business, in which individuals can become committed to 
a course of action that begins costing more than it is producing. Because it is often possible for 
persons who have suffered a setback to recoup their losses through an even greater commitment 
of resources to the same course of action, a cycle of escalating commitment can be produced (Staw, 
1981). This thesis has been designed with the purpose of trying to understand why that cycle exists 
and what factors may have significant influence on the cycle known as escalating commitment. 
Introduction:  
An escalation situation occurs when an individual incurs costs in pursuit of a goal that is 
unlikely to be attained no matter what future actions are taken (Staw, 1981). If the individual 
follows this “failing” course of action and continues to allocate resources to it, he or she is 
exhibiting escalation behavior (Whyte, 1991). As Sleesman, Conlon, McNamara, and Miles point 
out in their Meta study: “One of the most robust and costly decision errors addressed in 
organizational sciences has been the proclivity for decision makers to maintain commitment to 
losing courses of action, even in the face of quite negative news” (Brockner, 1992). 
 
This type of behavior has been around for decades and has been demonstrated publicly in 
many situations. Dating back to the 1980s, after an aggressive bidding war, Robert Campeau 
bought Bloomingdale's for an estimated $600 million more than the leverage buyout was in fact 
worth. In regards to this heated bidding war, The Wall Street Journal noted: "We're not dealing in 
price anymore but egos." Soon following the outlandish purchase, Campeau was forced to declare 
bankruptcy. Commentary and retrospective accounts of this project could easily be interchanged 
for other instances in history such as the rogue trades of Nick Leeson at Barings Bank (Jensen, 
Conlon, Humphrey, & Moon, 2011), the failed “Taurus” information technology project for the 
London Stock Exchange (Drummond, 1996), or Boston’s Big Dig Project (Dahl, 2011). In each 
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case a desire to avoid a modest loss was present as managers took ever-increasing risks by 
escalating commitment to a previously made decision in which they championed.  
Escalating commitment, according to Dr. Barry Staw’s definition, refers to a pattern of 
behavior in which an individual or a group will continue to rationalize their decisions, actions, and 
investments in an investment when faced with increasingly negative outcomes rather than alter 
their course of action. “Sunk cost fallacy”, a term closely associated with the escalation of 
commitment, has been used by economists and behavioral scientists to describe the phenomenon 
where people justify increased investment of money, time, and energy in a decision, based on the 
cumulative prior investment, or "sunk costs.” This is done despite new evidence suggesting that 
the cost of continuing the decision outweighs the expected benefit from said continuation. These 
decisions are irrational in their current context, but remain in alignment with the decisions and 
actions previously made, and they can be influenced by a variety of determinants and contexts 
(Staw, 1997). However, the dilemmas leading up to such decisions usually occur because the prior 
choices are no longer working, or the prior choices are presently causing personal or group losses. 
Put very simply, the escalation of commitment occurs when persistence is chosen over withdrawal. 
 
The question, in this case, is not how, but why does this phenomenon continue to exist. 
Over 35 years ago, management researchers began attempting to understand the complex answer 
to this simple question: Why do people continue to increase their level of commitment to a project 
that is so clearly failing? Enduring interest in this topic, known as the escalation of commitment 
among managers, has since grown due to the proliferation of variables that have come along with 
the answer to this question. Researchers taking interest in this topic pose questions like, “Is it the 
sense of personal responsibility for the initial decision that led to the decision to continue in the 
face of economic failure?” or “Is it pure determination to overcome the extent of sunk costs and 
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prove success?” and so on. The answer, as time has shown, is that there is not one answer to this 
complex question. As such, management researchers have focused their attention to the factors 
that influence the decision-making process.  
This study specifically focuses on the self-justification theory and external factors 
influencing decisions-making, such as company reputation. In addition, this study targeted 
university management accounting students who were faced with the choice of reinvesting for the 
benefit of short-term tax avoidance or the long-term benefits of sustainable investing.  
Our results did not support the hypotheses showing that no matter how negative the 
economic circumstances or how the reputation of the company may be impacted, students with 
equal financial information but differing responsibilities (i.e. those who made the initial decision 
to invest and those whose predecessors made the initial decision to invest) show an insignificance 
difference in their decisions to reinvest in the initial project. The findings do suggest, however 
there to be a significant difference in the decision to reinvest among accounting versus non-
accounting students. As one participant responded, “In the long-run I think consumers will opt for 
a green alternative, additionally CSR is a case against Option A and for Option B.” The results 
also point out the equaled balance in risk management systems among men and women. This 
finding can be interpreted from the absence of a significant difference in the decision to reinvest 
among men and women. The existence of gender differences in propensity to take risks has been 
documented in a large number of questionnaire and experimental studies. In a meta-analysis by 
Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999) reviewed over 150 papers on gender differences in risk 
perception. They concluded that the literature “clearly” indicated that “male participants are more 
likely to take risks than female participants” (p. 377). In this case, our study found the opposite to 
be true.  
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Literary Review:  
Theoretical Background  
The first empirical test of the escalation effect was presented by Barry M. Staw in 1976 at 
the University of California, Berkley. Staw surveyed 213 individuals, who were employed in a 
business position at the time, and asked them to allocate research and development funds to either 
two of the company’s divisions. Staw conducted this experiment by presenting each participant 
with one of two cases in which each student was instructed to act as the Financial Vice President 
of the Ace Research & Development Company. The participant was asked to complete a single 
case in which $4million had been invested in a research project. Currently (1) no benefits had been 
derived from the investment, and (2) a competitor had just exhibited a similar and superior product 
to that being developed by Ace (Rutledge & Harrell, 1993). Accordingly, participants were 
randomly separated into four groups where half received information that, as Financial Vice 
President, they originally recommended the investment project whereas the other half were told a 
predecessor made the decision. Additionally, half of the participants were presented with 
positively-framed cases (indicating potential gains) and the other half were presented with 
negatively-framed case (indicating potential losses) (Rutledge & Harrell, 1993). 
 Overall, the participants chose to allocate more money to their original chosen division 
and they continued to allocate more money to that division, even when it began declining in 
success. Staw concluded his experiment with the understanding that managers who are responsible 
for the initial decision to invest resources and activity into a project, will continue to invest in said 
project against all other things, including declining economic success.  
In addition to Staw’s initial contributions to the field, extended research on escalation 
behavior has been focused on identifying the psychological and economic determinants of 
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escalating commitment. Ruchala, Hill, and Dalton (1993) theorized that responsibility is important 
to the escalation cycle, but they concluded that this variable was not incorporated appropriately in 
previous studies. Under prior assumptions in most studies, the "responsible" participant makes the 
original choice and also decides whether to continue the project in the face of negative results or 
declining economic success. In contrast, the "irresponsible" participant only enters the experiment 
for the second decision, meaning the participant is not held responsible for making the initial 
decision to invest in the project. Per Ruchala, Hill, and Dalton (1993), the fact that some subjects 
enter the decision context mid-stream could cause confounding due to task framing and differences 
in beliefs. In order to combat this situation, a more specific variable called personal identification 
was used. In this case, a loan officer advocates initiating a loan relationship. To remove 
confounding concerns, all subjects made the initial decision to loan funds. After receiving 
additional information suggesting that the loan was a mistake, those same subjects were asked to 
make a subsequent decision regarding whether to continue the loan relationship. Those personally 
responsible chose to escalate to a greater degree. However, the greatest escalation occurred when 
personal identification existed and when blame for a failing loan relationship could be diffused 
(i.e., loan committee concurred with officer's view). If personal identification was present with no 
avenues to diffuse blame (i.e., sole responsibility for initial loan approval) escalation diminished 
entirely (Ruchala, Hill, Dalton, 1993).  
Additionally, other studies have addressed issues compatible with those of Ruchala, Hill 
and Dalton (1993). In 1978, Staw and Ross found that managers who attribute the cause of failure 
to exogenous factors tend to escalate commitment. In 1989, Barton, Duchon and Dunegon reported 
that responsible subjects given positive feedback chose to escalate more often than those given 
negative feedback. However, a predicted interaction between feedback type and level of 
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commitment was not supported in a laboratory experiment conducted by Walsh and Henderson 
(1989). In a case scenario where a strike by union members caused failure of a project 
(Leatherwood and Conlon, 1987), responsible subjects who could diffuse blame chose to 
withdraw. Those who were responsible for the initial decision to fund the project and should have 
foreseen the possibility of a strike tended to escalate. This study serves, among other things, to 
contradict Ruchala, Hill and Dalton's (1993) findings. 
In 1977, Staw and Fox expanded Staw’s 1976 study by testing whether escalation continues 
to occur over time. Results were consistent with Staw’s original (1976) experiment in that those 
who were responsible for the initial decision did commit significantly more funds than those who 
did not. Those subjects in the high efficacy condition also committed more funds while those 
labeled less effective did not choose to escalate (Staw & Fox, 1977). Overall, the experiment 
concluded that escalation did decrease over time, but the pattern found was not linear over the 
three-year period (Staw & Fox, 1977). Supporting this conclusion, McCain's empirical results also 
suggested that escalation occurs earlier in the investment cycle, but a process of de-escalation 
begins later in the cycle (McCain, 1986). 
Continuing their stream of research, Staw and Fox furthered this experimentation in 1979 
that supported a self-justification theory for escalation tendencies, but they found evidence of an 
additional motivation to continue committing funds. As concluded in the experiments, individual 
participants were motivated to externally justify actions. The data gathered suggested that 
"trapped" administrators are most likely to escalate commitment rather than change behavior due 
to both job insecurity and policy resistance. Those experiencing job insecurity or resistance to 
policy invested the most funds in apparently losing courses of action (Staw & Fox, 1979). The 
authors concluded that when worried about political vulnerability, administrators were less flexible 
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in decision making and it seemed that more funds were committed when need for external 
justification was high. This conclusion did not support the self-justification theory and, 
furthermore the need to justify actions to oneself was apparently secondary to meeting the demands 
on external factors.  
Furthering the study of external factors’ influence on decision making, Staw and Ross 
examined reactions of observers to decision successes and failures. Administrators, business 
students and psychology students were used as subjects to test the importance of both consistency 
and success in decision making. Administrators who were both consistent and eventually 
successful were rated highest regarding leadership effectiveness. Although all subjects viewed 
consistency as important, administrator subjects placed more value on consistency than student 
subjects did (Staw and Ross, 1980). However, escalation has been found in settings other than the 
typical laboratory study where decisions focus on allocation of funds. In 1982 Bazerman, Beckun, 
and Schoorman applied the self-justification theory in a performance evaluation context. When 
responsible for promoting a "failing" employee, managers were more likely to escalate 
commitment toward that employee by giving a more positive review and a more optimistic 
projection of future performance. Three reasons were cited for such responses: (1) Perceptual 
processes may be biased because negative cues are not fully acquired, (2) negative cues may be 
acquired but weighted differently due to biased judgmental processes, and (3) negative cues may 
be acquired and weighted properly but the decision maker may simply not be willing to publicly 
contradict a prior decision (Bazerman, Beckun, & Schoorman, 1982).  
Bazerman, Beckun, and Schoorman (1982) concluded that the need to justify to themselves 
or others that prior decisions were rational may induce individuals to distort their mental 
processing in an effort to appear rational. Distorting information to others is also suggested as a 
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consequence of the need to justify ones actions. Caldwell and O'Reilly (1982) recorded evidence 
that supports this view. They found that the selective use of information may be a conscious effort 
to manipulate signals sent to others in an effort to manage others' interpretations of the failure. 
Justification attempts are thought to include management of communication as well as simple 
persistence of behavior (Klimek, 1997).  
Among the many studies in this field, those previously cited and others, there have been 
multiple factors that have been concluded to have an influence over escalation behavior. In 
summary, a psychological explanation for escalation of commitment stresses that justification 
processes are invoked when the individual takes responsibility for making the decision that proves 
to be failing. Responsibility taken by the individual implies an opportunity to choose between 
alternatives and that consequences of actions that are known or at least relatively foreseeable. The 
stronger the commitment, which is a function of choice and foreseeability, the greater the 
resistance to change or the greater the tendency to escalate. Escalation by a decision maker leaves 
open the possibility for future success from a now failing course of action. Such a success would 
serve to justify one's actions to him/herself and thus reduce psychological dissonance. The need to 
justify past decisions may also stem from pressure by external sources. Like self-justification, 
external justification may promote escalation behaviors. Continued funding of failing projects may 
give others a more positive impression of the decision maker if eventual success occurs than if that 
decision maker admitted failure early without trying to rectify the bad situation. From a 
psychological viewpoint, a model explaining an individual's tendency to escalate should include 
the decision maker's need for self-justification and for external justification. Among many factors, 
three theories from psychology and economics will be employed in this study to explain escalation 
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behavior, including: self-justification theory, prospect theory, and agency theory (Sleesman, 
2012). 
Self-Justification Theory 
  Self-justification describes the behavior that occurs when a person encounters cognitive 
dissonance, or a situation in which a person's behavior is inconsistent with their beliefs, that person 
tends to justify the behavior and deny any negative feedback associated with the behavior. This 
thought process is a part of commitment decisions of leaders and managers in any position of 
power and can therefore cause a rise in commitment levels. Furthermore, self-justification theory 
has the longest history in the escalation literature and draws on cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1957) and psychological commitment (Kiesler, 1971) to argue that self-justification is an important 
psychological process underlying escalation behavior. This attitude provides “one explanation for 
why people escalate commitment to their past investments.” In essence, managers make decisions 
that reflect previous behavior patterns and managers tend to recall and follow information that is 
aligned to their behavior to create consistency for their current and future decisions; a ways of 
subconsciously justifying their initial decision. Furthermore, decision makers are not willing to 
admit that they have made a mistake and, in order to maintain the illusion that they have not erred 
by committing to the failing course of action, they continue to invest in the decision. Studies show 
that managers are more likely to commit to an unprofitable project that they themselves initiated 
(Staw, 1976, 1981). As a result, individual responsibility for initiating an unprofitable project 
creates a self-justification motive. 
Prospect Theory  
 Prospect theory is a behavioral economic theory that describes the way people choose 
between probabilistic alternatives that involve risk, where the probabilities of outcomes are known. 
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This theory helps to describe the natural reactions and processes involved in making a decision in 
a risk-taking situation. Furthermore, prospect theory asserts that individuals show risk-seeking 
behavior when outcomes to decision alternatives are framed negatively. When alternatives are 
framed as a choice between a sure loss (the loss of the investment already spent) and the possibility 
of a larger loss combined with a chance to return to the original expected outcome (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Whyte, 1986), decision-makers prefer the risky alternative, even when its expected 
value is less than the certain alternative (abandonment). On the other hand, risk-averse behavior is 
expected when the decision outcomes are positively framed. This occurs when there is a choice 
between a sure gain (the initial return on the investment) and a gain which is less certain 
(Bazerman, 1984; Rutledge & Harrell, 1993). Prospect theorists believe that one’s use of this 
process is when there is a negative downfall in the stakes that will affect the outcome of the project. 
To ensure they will not fail, the individual may add more resources to assure them that they will 
succeed. Though this theory seems realistic, researchers Davis and Bobko (1986) found no effect 
of personal responsibility on continued commitment to the previous course of action in the positive 
frame condition. Which means that escalation of commitment will be lower in the higher 
responsibility situation. Therefore, in escalation decisions, where the existence of a sunk cost may 
be equivalent to framing as a sure loss in the absence of escalation, individuals are more likely to 
allocate additional resources to an unprofitable project (Salter, 2013). 
Agency Theory  
 The agency theory is a supposition that explains the relationship between principals and 
agents in business. This theory is specifically concerned with resolving problems that can exist in 
agency relationships; that is, between principals (such as shareholders) and agents of the principals 
(such as managers/executives). Because this relationship exists, under agency theory the 
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relationship between principal and agent is considered the main factor, among those considered, 
when making a decision. Therefore, agents will, under certain conditions, make decisions that 
maximize their own personal utility, not that of the principal. With that being said, it is important 
to consider how incentives and the availability of information affect the relationships between 
principals and agents.  
Two different information conditions may exist in a firm. If a principal has complete 
information with which to monitor an agent's actions, all information is public, and a condition of 
information symmetry prevails. In such an environment, it is in the best interests of the agent to 
discontinue a failing project because the principal will also know the project is failing. However, 
a divergence will occur when this is not the case.  When an agent has private information about 
the projected future performance of a project, the principal is unable to completely monitor the 
agent's actions and decisions. Therefore, information asymmetry prevails. Here, the potential for 
goal conflict between the principal and agent arises. If, for instance, an agent's reputation was hurt 
by a decision to discontinue a project he or she had started, the event would negatively affect the 
agent's future career opportunities, thus providing an incentive to continue to invest in the project 
regardless of its economic success.  
In the context of managerial escalation of commitment, information asymmetry, means 
that the manager knows, and will continue to know, more about the performance of the 
unprofitable project than his/her superior or the firm's owners. When the manager is responsible 
for the project, they has an incentive to escalate an unprofitable project against the principal's 
interests in order to protect his/her reputation and future career prospects (Harrison, 1993).  
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External Influences on Theories  
 It is also important to consider external influences whenever examining behavioral 
influences on decision making, regardless of the setting (i.e. business environment). National 
culture, defined by Hofstede, is “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the 
members of one group or society from another.” This factor may affect the influence of 
psychological factors in decision-making, and may affect the rationality calculus underlying 
adverse selection. Prospect and agency theories were developed in North America and may 
therefore be biased by North American values (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). Based on a survey of 
116,000 workers from 72 countries, Hofstede (1980, 1983, & 2001) identified four dimensions of 
national culture: Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism, and Masculinity. 
Hofstede and Bond (1988) added a fifth dimension: Long Term Orientation. Individualism implies 
a loosely-knit social framework in which people are expected to take care of themselves and their 
immediate families only, while collectivism is characterized by a tight social framework in which 
people distinguish between in-groups and outgroups. People in collectivist cultures expect that 
other members of the group they belong to will look after them, and in turn they owe absolute 
loyalty to the group. The individual is motivated by group interests and emphasizes the 
maintenance of interpersonal harmony. In contrast, people from an individualistic culture tend to 
place their self-interest ahead of those of the group. 
Management Accounting  
 The primary objective of management accountants is the process of identifying, measuring, 
analyzing, interpreting, and communicating information for the pursuit of an organization's goals 
(Martin, Chapter 1). Furthermore, managerial accounting information is aimed at helping 
managers within the organization make decisions internally. More specifically, management 
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accounting contains a number of decision‑making tools that require the conversion of all operating 
costs and expenses into fixed and variable components. The responsibility for providing this cost 
behavior information falls squarely upon the shoulders of the management accountant. 
Additionally, the conversion of ordinary financial data as typically found in the general ledger 
accounts requires that the management accountant have a thorough understanding of cost behavior 
theory, applied specifically in this study.  
In addition to the responsibilities and understanding that come with management 
accounting, external factors also play a role in decision making. As such, this study was designed 
to target two prominent factors in decision-making today: corporate tax avoidance strategies versus 
sustainable investing and how the reputation of a company continues respectively.  
Long-run corporate tax avoidance has been described as a theory that is based on the ability 
to pay a low amount of cash taxes per dollar of pre‐tax earnings over long time periods (Dyreng, 
Hanlon, & Maydew, 2008). In recent years, corporate tax strategies have become the focus of some 
high-profile public debates. In the past decade alone, the public has become increasingly aware of 
corporate motivations to implement tax strategies. Hungry for tax revenue, cash-starved 
governments around the world also have pushed for greater transparency in corporate tax returns 
(Hyatt, 2015). 
As a result, corporate leaders in the United States have become more aware of how tax 
avoidance strategies may serve to destroy the company’s reputation in the eye of the public before 
any financial returns are able to be recognized. As a result, finance executives, as well as corporate 
CEO’s have found that they have an important role in tax that is over and above just assessing 
complex accounting and financial impacts. That role is to calculate the implications that any tax 
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decisions could have for a company’s public image and reputation (Hyatt, 2015). However, these 
changes in corporate management’s decisions are significantly different from those made in the 
past. In the past, a company’s tax function might have toiled in near-seclusion. During their 
deliberations, tax experts would balance two competing factors: the fiduciary responsibility to 
comply with all relevant laws and regulations, and the corporate directive to protect profit margins 
by minimizing tax liabilities (Hyatt, 2015). 
In today’s day and age, finance executives must add another layer of scrutiny to those 
traditional considerations in order to stay above breakeven. This additional consideration must 
include how the company’s tax strategies will be perceived in the eyes of the public. Corporations, 
now, face the risk of being viewed as loophole-driven, devious, or even unpatriotic company who 
is not living out its mission. Such public perception has the abrupt ability to destroy a company’s 
customer base and ultimately send the company into economic failure.  
To assess how much influence public awareness exerts on tax planning strategies, CFO 
Research conducted a study of finance executives at large U.S. companies. The project, co-
sponsored by KPMG, LLP included an online survey which was sent to U.S. finance and tax 
executives employed at companies with more than $1 billion in annual revenues in FY14. In 
addition to analyzing the 112 responses to the survey, CFO Research also conducted in-depth 
interviews with two senior executives at U.S. companies with international operations and came 
to results that revealed that many finance and tax executives say their companies are allocating 
extreme amounts of attention and resources to their tax strategy. More and more, the risks 
surrounding tax planning, whether related to reputation, compliance, or strategy, are being 
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weighed when executives make operating decisions and set financial policies (CFO Research & 
KPMG, 2015). 
At the same time, as millennials begin their rise as the next generation to take control of 
the world, corporate social responsible and company transparency is becoming, what some argue 
to be, a necessity in order to attain corporate longevity and ultimate sustainability. By definition, 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a duty of every corporate body to protect the interest of 
the society at large (Fontaine, 2013). Many companies have started to engage in CSR as a strategy 
in order to gain benefits that can give them an added advantage over their competitors. There have 
been increasing numbers of companies engaged in CSR activities to run their businesses. 
Nowadays CSR can drive companies to succeed in business by increasing sales volume and brand 
awareness (GRR, 2014).  
The sustainable investing model, advocated by a study done by Oxford University, 
involves investing having regard to a broader mission, deeper thinking on investment strategy and 
a longer-term framework for evaluating success. Oxford researchers suggest sustainable investing 
preferably includes two elements. First, it involves a long-term investment strategy whose value 
creation proposition promotes current achievement without compromising future achievement and 
secondly, sustainability requires investors to act fairly by considering the externalities created by 
their investments and their social responsibilities (Urwin, 2009). This second part of the 
sustainable investing model includes the integration of Environmental, Social, Governance (ESG) 
factors and ownership responsibilities; such factors are central to responsible investing codes 
established to support mitigations of future societal discord from problems like climate change and 
natural resource degradation (Uriwn, 2009). 
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Though sustainable investing does not always demonstrate the most return on investment 
in the short-run (due to extensive transition costs, disposal costs, etc.), companies are beginning to 
view a sustainable lens as the most “popular” way to run their business. The integration of ESG 
factors into the investment decision making process broadens the spectrum of risks being 
considered and, by nature, addresses the volatility of an investment as well. This could mean that 
the investment is likely to perform better for longer, demonstrating a greater return on investment 
that can be sustained longer. It is a common belief that sustainable investments yield less than 
conventional investments, however there is evidence to indicate that companies with better ESG 
standards can and do generate better risk-adjusted returns (Urwin, 2009). This internal benefit is 
as heavily weighed, when considering sustainable investment, as the perception such investments 
have in the minds of shareholders and the public as well.  
For example, NIKE Corporation has proven success in this way and has turned their 
sustainable investment into a competitive advantage among competitors. The strategic move was 
made by NIKE back in the 1990s turning their defensive reaction to labor and environmental issues 
into the driving force behind the company’s new culture, strategy, mission, and competitive edge. 
Currently supplying one-third of the world’s sportswear and training shoes, NIKE posts industry 
leading financials that are currently up 16% from 2011 (NIKE, 2015). NIKE financially remains 
incredibly strong against its competitors by pushing boundaries of sustainable innovation. NIKE’s 
business strategy of decoupling themselves from constrained resources has not only allowed them 
to leave a lighter footprint, but has turned out to be cost effective as well. Such investments in 
sustainable efforts like the new ColorDry technology has resulted in two times as much revenue 
earned, 23.8% return on invested capital, and a 96% increase in the stock price the last five years 
alone (NIKE, 2015).  In effect, this strategy runs rich with a unique history and colorful innovation 
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that has provided the Oregon based corporation with a unique and valuable position in the Apparel 
Footwear and Accessories market. NIKE’s strategy implements their belief in sustainable 
innovation that benefits all stakeholders involved in the process; including the environment.  
Hypothesis Development 
Based on the above literature, this experiment seeks to examine two hypotheses which will 
consider how the context of a decision and the type of information presented influences the 
student’s choice. First, we argue that managers will have greater concern for the value of their own 
reputations, which would enhance the self-justification effect. Therefore, the first hypothesis (H1), 
based on Staw’s original experiment, predicts that those students who are responsible for the initial 
decision will demonstrate an escalating commitment to the decision and will continue to invest 
resources in the original decision (i.e. fossil fuels), no matter how negative the economic 
circumstances or how the reputation of the company may be impacted.   
The second hypothesis (H2) predicts that students given adequate financial information to 
reinvest in a more sustainable option (regardless of the case assigned) will choose to invest in the 
more sustainable option regardless of the tax affects, in order to promote a quality company 
reputation.  
Methodology  
Research Methods  
A decision-making experiment was performed to examine the two hypotheses presented 
above. Prior escalation effect studies, as previously cited above, have also employed decision 
making tasks. Suggestions for improving prior studies were incorporated into the experiment in 
multiple ways. Both retrospective (past-oriented) and prospective (future-oriented) information 
were provided to the participants (Appendix 1 & 2). Concrete, rather than ambiguous, 
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circumstances were presented, with probabilistic information being provided about future 
performance expectations (Bowen, 1987; Northcraft & Wolf, 1984). Both positively-framed and 
negatively-framed information was provided to the participants (Bazerman, 1984).  Lastly, the 
new additions to this experiment include (1) tax effects versus sustainable investing in regards to 
the company’s reputation, and (2) the distribution of two cases in order to reveal any relation to 
the self-justification theory.  
Participants 
 A total of 96 individuals participated in this study. Each participant was enrolled as a full-
time student at the University of New Hampshire’s Paul College of Business and Economics. The 
typical individual who participated was 22 years of age and included 60 (63%) males and 32 
(33.3%) females. Additionally, the population of participants was comprised of 62 accounting 
students and 33 non-accounting students (i.e. those students whose chosen majors did not include 
accounting). The data were collected during the participants’ regularly scheduled courses during 
the spring, 2016 semester. All responses were anonymous. Based on Paul College’s academic 
curriculum required for accounting majors, as well as the course curriculum designed for Strategic 
Management and Decision Making, each participant was deemed to be well-qualified for the 
managerial/budgeting decision making experiment.  
Instrument and Data Collection 
In an effort to understand the behavioral aspects of escalating commitment further, this 
experiment has been designed to model Staw’s original experiment (as outlined in prior sections), 
using college undergraduate students, who attend the Paul College of Business and Economics at 
the University of New Hampshire (UNH) as research participants. These students were selected as 
participants due to their enrollment in the Advanced Managerial Accounting, Master’s in 
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Accountancy (MSA) course, and a Strategic Management in Decision Making course offered at 
UNH. Said participants made up two treatment group (Accounting majors and other various 
undergraduate business majors). The students were addressed prior to completing the case study 
and informed of the following:  
“Hello. My name is Victoria (Tori) Forrest. I am currently working with Professor Hasseldine on 
my honors thesis. My project is escalating commitment among business investments and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) among managerial accountants, specifically. To add an extra layer of 
depth, I am researching the decision making preferences among UNH business and accounting 
majors. This data will be beneficial, as it will add to my analysis of different trends, and may be 
helpful to others looking for information about college students’ attitudes toward commitment to 
company projects. I am hoping to survey about 100 students. All that this study requires is reading 
a situational case and answering a survey question regarding what the final decision should be, 
in your own opinion. It should only take about 10-15 minutes. There are minimal risks involved. 
Your participation is completely voluntary. There is no penalty if you choose not to complete the 
survey. You may also stop taking the survey at any time without penalty. All of the surveys will 
kept private between myself and Professor Hasseldine. The collected data will be reported in my 
final thesis paper, which will be submitted to the PCBE Honors Advisors and may be published at 
some point in the near future. The survey is completely anonymous, so your name will not be 
attached to it.  If you have any questions please feel free to ask me. By taking a survey you are 
consenting to everything outlined here.” 
Experimental Task 
The cases were distributed to students individually ensuring the first student received Case 
1, the second student received Case 2, and so on (a pattern that repeated until each student was 
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give of the two cases). Upon distribution the students were given 10-15 minutes to read the case 
study and complete the questions following each the respective case (Appendix 1 & Appendix 2).  
In essence, an executive (student proxy) was asked to read the case through and position 
themselves in the respective scenario and to make a decision based on the information given. 
Treatment Group 1 consisted of accounting students who were enrolled in Advanced Managerial 
Accounting and MSA and Treatment Group 2 consisted of the students in Strategic Management 
in Decision Making. Each case explains that the student must assume the role of Financial VP of 
Ace Research Company. In Case 1 the student’s role of Financial VP is a position they have held 
in the past and therefore, they are the individual responsible for the initial investment in Ace 
Research Company’s Project X1 product. In Case 2 the student’s role of Financial VP is a position 
previously held by a predecessor and therefore, they are not the individual responsible for the 
initial investment in Ace Research Company’s X1 product. Regardless of the initial scenario, the 
student in each case in then asked to consider a competitor who has presented a similar product to 
the market that runs on fossil fuels (oil) but presents slightly cheaper than Ace’s current Project 
X1 product. The student is asked to make a decision among the following choice:  
1. Option 1.) Invest $4M to manufacture the X1 offshore using fossil fuels as a power source, 
but it will undercut the competitor because it will be made with low labor costs and in a 
low-taxed country.  One potential risk is that Ace’s reputation (and profits) may suffer if it 
is exposed as a tax-avoiding firm.  
2. Option 2.) Invest an additional $4M to convert the power source into alternative sustainable 
fuel source.  Although the competitor’s oil-powered product would still outperform the X1, 
you believe that with a tax credit offered to buyers, there will still be a market for a “green 
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X1”.  One potential risk is that Ace’s reputation (and profits) may suffer if consumers do 
not opt for the “green X1”. 
These two treatment groups allow the experiment to target two conditions (tax implications 
and sustainable investments) from the perspective of two groups of decision makers. The made 
their decisions in solidarity with no external influences other than the information presented in 
each case.  
Results  
 Analysis of variance was used to analyze the data and to isolate specific variables within 
the experiment. The two independent variables were the “tax implications” and “sustainable 
investing” manipulations described above in the previous section. The participants’ decision 
functioned as the dependent variable and was determined based on where they placed the “X” on 
their individual scale in each case respectively (Appendix 1 & 2). During the data collection and 
analysis process, numbers were assigned as a value based on where the participant placed the “X”. 
These values ranged from 1.0 (“Definitely Prefer A”) to 7.0 (“Definitely Prefer B”), included 0.5 
increments respectively, and an indifference point of 4.0.  
 As such, the data was broken down and analyzed based on gender, major (accounting 
versus non-accounting), self-justification (if the initial decision to invest in the project was a 
significant factor in the student’s decision to reinvest), and the frequencies of these outputs was 
analyzed as well. Significance was demonstrated in one of the data analyses: between accounting 
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In further analysis of this cross section of the data, it is interesting to note that of the 
accounting versus non-accounting majors, males were the significant gender creating the 
significant difference in the decision making among majors. Male accounting majors returned an 
average decision of 4.443 and non-accounting majors returned an average decision of 5.420, (p = 
.018. Whereas female accounting majors returned an average decision of 4.979 and non-




Additionally, another result that should be noted came from the lack of significant 
difference in the decision among genders. Males returned an average decision of 4.850 and females 
returned an average decision of 5.078, (p = .493). This finding is particularly note-worthy due to 
the fact that men have historically been more risk-taking by nature and females the opposite. 
The existence of gender differences in propensity to take risks has been documented in a 
large number of questionnaire and experimental studies. For example, a meta-analysis by Byrnes, 
Miller, and Schafer (1999) reviewed over 150 papers on gender differences in risk perception. 
They concluded that the literature “clearly” indicated that “male participants are more likely to 
take risks than female participants” (p. 377). Recent work has begun to examine the generality and 
cognitive underpinnings of these differences in greater detail (Slovic, 1997). In one important 
study that provides a backdrop for the present investigation, Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) 
assessed the risks that men and women perceived in behaviors spanning five different content 
domains (financial, health/safety, recreational, ethical, and social decisions). Gender differences 
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males perceiving less risk and indicating a greater likelihood of engaging in risky behaviors. 
Similar gender differences have been found in these domains in a large German sample 
(Johnson,Wilke, &Weber, 2004). 
Analysis Discussion  
 The first hypothesis (H1) predicted that those students who were responsible for the initial 
investment decision would demonstrate an escalating commitment to said decision and will 
continue to invest resources in the original decision (i.e. fossil fuels), no matter how negative the 
economic circumstances or how the reputation of the company may be impacted.  The standard 
deviation analysis of the results does not support this hypothesis. As summarized in the table 
below, participants who received Case 1 versus Case 2 did not exhibit a significant tendency to 
reinvest resources in the original decision (i.e. fossil fuels) given they were the ones responsible 
for making the initial investment in Project X1. This was determined by cross-tabulation of the 
investment decision (fossil fuels or sustainable fuel) weighted 1.0-7.0 among all participants with 
the respective cases given (Case 1 or Case 2).  As such, Fisher’s Exact Test was significant (p = 
.009) with the average decision of Case 1 being 5.4 and Case 2 being 5.5.  
The second hypothesis (H2) predicted that students given adequate financial information 
to reinvest in a more sustainable option (regardless of the case assigned) would choose to invest 
in the more sustainable option regardless of the tax affects, in order to promote a quality company 
reputation. The results do not support this hypothesis either, as there was no significant difference 
in results among students who received Case 1 versus those who received Case 2. Refer to the 





 After the discussion and analysis of the experiment and data results, it is appropriate to 
address some limitations and strengths of the research. As modeled after prior studies (formerly 
mentioned), the hypotheses were examined asking the participants to complete an experimental 
task. Said participants were not selected randomly, in fact, the participants of this study were 
selected because of the course in which they enrolled. In effect, it is possible that these individual 
may not be representative of the entire population of management accountants and managers who 
do not study accounting, respectively.  This assumption is desirable in order to be able generalize 
the results.  
 A strength of this study was that it was designed to target specific variables among 
managers in present time (tax avoidance strategies versus sustainable investing). These factors 
were able to be targeted while also testing the self-justification theory by giving participants the 













(Case 1)  
No Self-Justification 
(Case 2)  
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 This research should be extended in several ways. First, it would be relevant to apply the 
same procedures to a different population. For example, using managerial accountants in the 
professional world who have depth of management experience versus other middle and/or 
executive managers who have no particular accounting affiliation, but possess the same real world 
experience. This population may be better suited to represent the entire population and allow for 
the study’s results to be generalized. Future studies might also consider using a population 
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